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Margaret Schabas ' -Breaking Away‖ manifesto (1992) called for the historians of economics to identify themselves more with their colleagues in the history of science and less with those in the discipline of economics. Her -Coming Together‖ update (2002) assessed what historians of economics had been doing since 1992, showing that some progress has been made toward her goal, but that much remained to be done. Central to Schabas' efforts is the claim that the history of economics needs to stop being simply the vindication of the discipline of economics (economists don't need it, so why chase after them?); implicitly her argument is that the history of science stopped providing a vindication of modern science some time ago. My own contribution to the debate over Schabas' manifesto (Emmett 1997) did not examine the existing literature on the history of economics in light of Schabas' manifesto, but instead focused on how one's understanding of the relation between the community of historians of science and scientific communities could assist with reconstructing the relation between the community of historians of economics and the scientific community of economists. Like Schabas, I argued that historians of economics, qua historians, share more with historians of science than they do with economists, although I simultaneously suggested the relation was more nuanced than Schabas suggests, given that the rational reconstruction of past arguments may be part of economic thought today 2 and that just as historians of science have used sociology and are beginning to use economics to explain the history of science, historians of economics may end up using the discipline they study to explain its own history. theories and practices. Indeed, economists, like most scientists, don't spend their days wondering if their models constitute -good science‖ -they spend their days using and improving their models, which also means they spend time finding data, improving the tools they use to evaluate the models and data, teaching, seeking grant monies, persuading others that their improved models work well, etc. Contemporary science theory reminds us that scientists engage in the same types of activities we do, and have no special access to the progress of knowledge.
Historians of science and economics are also freed, because Hands' story allows us to stop telling the story of how and why scientific advancement occurred by the rules set by some undefined standard. Historians can focus on historical reconstruction -sorting out and telling how scientists and economics in particular time and places worked, what tools they developed to assist them with their activities, why they considered the products of their work to constitute contributions to knowledge, and how others were persuaded of the scientific status of their work.
What were the rules by which -science‖ survived and thrived in the past? Such an endeavor is illuminating, even if we can't say that the rules were correct, or even that the conclusions scientists in the past reached helped us to understand better what the correct rules for scientific knowledge are. As Hands reminds us at the end of his introduction, a viewpoint such as the one he identifies, and which I will argue underlies much of the work currently being done in the history of science (if not always in the history of economics), -is not inconsistent with the basic Enlightenment commitment to science as a uniquely worthy form of life‖ (Hands 2001, 8) . And I might add that it does nothing to deny that the historical study of scientific and economic knowledge in the past remains a worthy act of appreciation for that unique form of life.
One way to evaluate whether the history of economics has moved toward the history of science is to compare recent work in both fields. In order to narrow the comparison in two rapidly expanding publication areas, I decided to examine two corresponding sets of literature in each for us as we examine the other winners. What do the new studies in the history of science and economics look like? Do they look increasingly alike as they depart from the quest to judge the growth of scientific and economic knowledge by some set of external standards? Are these fields, as Schabas desires, becoming unified? These questions will be addressed, but first, let's look at the authors.
The Authors
The history of science prizes have been awarded to 12 individuals (8 individual authors, and 2 sets of co-authors). The history of economics prizes have been awarded to 10 individual authors (no co-authored papers). Seven of the10 economics prize winners are located in economics departments; the others are in history 5 ; business history (McCraw); and the history of political thought (Hont) . Six of the 12 history of science prize winners are located in history of science programs 6 ; four more are in history departments 7 ; one is in a classics department 8 ; and one is in a 3 One difference between the societies' respective best article prizes is that, while the HSS limits its selection to articles published in the Society's journal Isis, the HES accepts nominations of articles published in any journal. 4 See appendix 1 for a list of the award winners and more about the prizes. (Hankins 1977) . And Mauro
Boianovsky of the University of Brasilia won the HES best article award in 1999 (Boianovsky 1998) . Only one author has won both the best article and best book prizes from either society:
Deborah Harkness (Harkness 1997 (Harkness , 2007 
A Simple Framework to Guide Our Comparison
I struggled to find an appropriate means by which to compare these works. Despite their commonalities, they are a disparate lot. They cross centuries: although most examine the economics or science of the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries, one winner of an article prize examines optic science in the ancient Greeks, and several book awards have gone to 13 In fact, the only members of American economics departments to win the best article prize since its inception are David M. Levy (2002) and Craufurd Goodwin (1998). Goodwin's co-author was a student who has become the partner of an investment firm. 14 Lest one suspect that the HSS granted Harkness both awards for the same work, her earlier work on the Dee family plays only a small role in The Jewel House (Harkness 2007, 222-23) , although it did become the basis for another book (Harkness 1999 One thing they all share is historical sources: with one quite understandable exception, 17 every winner uses primary source materials other than published texts in their research. Personal correspondence, unpublished drafts of papers and reports, oral history, diaries, scientific journals, laboratory reports, etc. all find their place among the award winners.
17 Daryn Lehoux only uses extant texts from Greek philosophy.
So how can these award-winning books and articles be organized for comparative purposes that would be useful for the purpose of considering the progress of Schabas' call for historians of economics to become like historians of science? In the end, I decided on a simple heuristic which will allow me to address that purpose.
Imagine, if you will, a long table. Draped across the table is an even longer cloth. At one end of the table is a little sign that reads -Ideas.‖ A similar sign at the other end reads -Practices.‖ Halfway between the two is a third sign --People.‖ Admittedly crude, this imaginary table allows us to place the books relative to each other along a spectrum running from a primary focus on ideas to a primary focus on practices (see figure 1 ). The table also allows us to see that movement away from the ends inevitably moves us toward a consideration of people. The central role of people is also indicative of the role that people play as the mediators between ideas and practices; thus, studies which focus exclusively on ideas will seldom deal with practices (and vice versa), but those which do incorporate personal material regarding the scientist(s) will often do so in the process of describing how ideas and practices intersect. Finally, the heuristic raises the interesting question of whether the history of practices might not have more in common with the history of ideas than it does with biography. Or, to put it positively, to the extent that histories of ideas begin to incorporate the people thinking about the ideas, they may look similar to the histories of practices which also incorporate material about the people undertaking them. Words are deeds, as Wittgenstein said.
So much for the organizing heuristic, now let's use it to see if it helps work through the differences among our award-winning books and articles.
Ideas ↔ People
At the core of the old approach to the history of science and economics was the assumption that what mattered were the theories and ideas of scientists and economists, and that the history of scientific/economic knowledge was story of the development of better theories to replace previous ones through a rational process. A common heuristic device was the association of theories with particular people or groups, and historical information about those individuals or groups was accepted as useful background knowledge for historians to employ in constructing the sequence of theoretical development. The transition from Smithian -absolute advantage‖ to Ricardian -comparative advantage,‖ and then to the Heckscher/Ohlin emendations of Ricardo, leading to the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, provides a common economic example.
Problematize that model by introducing the Leontief paradox, and challenge it with Krugman's geography of trade, and you have a nice heuristic for remembering the development of international trade theory, capped at each post-1950 point by a Nobel prize winner. If the people behind the names were relevant to that development, the story often focused on how they came to their ideas, often against great odds. But this personal history, as George Stigler (Stigler 1965 (Stigler , 1982 argued, was incidental ultimately to the history of ideas, which were science itself.
A quick look at Figure 1 will show that the -Ideas‖ end of the table is less occupied than the -Practices‖ end is, and most of the works are arranged toward the middle of the table. But we'll start with the clearest example of a -history of ideas‖ approach among our award winners:
Istvan's Hont's Jealousy of Trade. Hont tells us right up front that the purpose of his study is -to identify political insights in eighteenth-century theories of international market rivalry that continue to be relevant for the twenty-first century‖ (Hont 2005, 4) . He goes on to remark that intellectual history is most useful when -it unmasks impasses and eliminates repetitive patterns of controversy‖ (Hont 2005, 4) . Jealousy of Trade, he tells us, has its -eyes firmly fixed on the challenges of today‖ (Hont 2005, 5) . Here is a history congruent with Cristina Marcuzzo's argument 18 that the history of economic thought is (to quote a historian of scientific thought)
-one long argument‖ (Mayer 1993) and that a study of the essential components of the argument at some point in the past can illuminate our concerns today. In his essay on the -Rich-CountryPoor Country‖ debate (Hont 2005, 267-322) , for example, he rationally reconstructs David
Hume's argument in a 12-step process which those engaged in similar debates today over outsourcing and international trade could easily use to defend a nuanced version of the free trade argument. Using historical documents unavailable to most of Hume's contemporaries, 19 Hont shows that the argument was indeed coherent and makes sense in the context of contemporary debate. Furthermore, he shows why the contributions of Scottish political economy (especially Hume and Adam Smith) ended the prospects of meaningful discussion of commercial society within the confines of the language of civic humanism. In other words, Hont's argument is built on the assumption that the Enlightenment project remains an integral part of modern discourse, 18 In her presidential address to ESHET. I need to get the reference. 19 Anticipating a point yet to be made, the use of archival materials is not enough to identify an author as a practitioner of the new history of economics/science.
and that rationally reconstructing the work of its earliest proponents can illuminate contemporary (in both senses of the word!) discourse.
Even though Hont's book is firmly in the -history of ideas‖ camp, you will notice that it is not at the extreme end of the table. Hont's work is in the Cambridge tradition of historiography (Skinner [1969] The other work included in this space is the article on consumer demand theorists by Ivan
Moscati. Moscati's article is difficult to categorize for two reasons. On the one hand, his purpose is to provide an account of the economists' indifference to the early experimental findings regarding consumer demand that turns on their desire to protect their theory from attack, especially attacks which appear as weak as they see the experimental findings to be. Moscati's purpose could imply the need for a richly textured examination of the theorists' professional lives, the nature of the evolving relations between disciplines from the inter-war to the post-war period, and the type of epistemological claims that economists were willing to accept. He does provide accounts of the experiments the psychologists ran, and how the experiments arose from the psychologists interactions with the economists. However, although he admits that -the meager influence of the experimental research may be explained by bringing into play academic, social, political, or economic factors‖(emphasis added), Moscati goes on to suggest a -purely epistemological‖ rationale: -empirical evidence contrary to a scientific theory can be always imputed to the failure of some auxiliary assumption‖ and -a scientific theory is rejected only if it can be replaced by a practical alternative‖ (Moscati 2007, 393) . Thus, the explanation he provides, on the other hand, is the evolution of ideas by logical progression, stripped of any role for the people involved. While the epistemological claim may be logically sufficient, one However, for all the reasons that the tension between context and progress are present in the histories told among our prize winners, biography is both welcomed and avoided. After all, historians and biographers have always had an on-again, off-again relationship. When intellectual development is emphasized, biography is denigrated, except to the extent that people like to hear stories about great heroes they admire. If our lives, our tools, our practices, even the warp and woof of our daily life, matters to the development of science, then studies of crucial junctures in that development, even though often misunderstood at the time or in our standard histories, can re-enliven our sense of how science moves forward. Put differently, biography reminds us that our histories are not clinical trials or reconstructed logical arguments, but narratives, with both a strong sense of plot and a keen desire to admire the richness of life as the stories move along.
Practices ↔ People
The The histories on this side of the table in Figure 1 , then, historically reconstruct the practices and tools of scientists and economists in their own settings. Just as tools and practices appear in the studies at the other end of the table as means by which to communicate ideas, ideas here provide the opportunity for scientists to engage in the tasks of measurement, calculation, persuasion, model-building, grant-writing, corresponding with others, and even teaching, and also appear as the consequence, often fleeting, sometimes unintentional, of those tasks.
Kaiser's history of the Feynman diagrams is a wonderful representative of what a focus on practices can achieve. Feynman himself makes few appearances in the book, because beyond the first chapter, it is not about his creation of the diagrams. Rather, Kaiser tells the story of how the diagrams were dispersed across the theoretical physics discipline, and how they were adapted by others in the process, sometimes for the own purposes, and sometimes in ways that clarified or standardized them. In fact, the book is almost the biography of a tool. The people who appear in Kaiser's book are those responsible for the dispersion of the diagrams: Freeman Dyson, Tomonaga Sin-itiro, and Geoffrey Chew, to name just a few of the young theorists in whose hands the Feynman diagrams were put to use. But Kaiser's focus remains on the diagrams, almost as if the people become the instruments by which the diagrams take on a life of their own as they are passed around the world and across time. Much like Darwin's garden in the hands of Janet Browne, the physicists' lives and seminar rooms become the setting in which Kaiser displays the tool at work.
Another example will help strengthen our sense of the distance the literature at the -Practices‖ end of the table stands from not only from a focus on -Ideas,‖ but also from the biographies located at the middle of our table. Deborah Harkness's The Jewel House examines scientific and medical practice in London at the beginning of the -Scientific Revolution.‖ In a particularly effective chapter, Harkness points out that Elizabethan projects share some similarities with -Big Science‖ today -the royal promotion of -all good sciences and wise and learned inventions tending to the benefit of the commonwealth of our said Realm and Dominions, and serving for the defense thereof‖ (Harkness 2007, 143-44) . Her real purpose in talking of -Big Science,‖ however, is to goad us into realizing that Elizabethan projects did not stand at the beginning of a continuous line of scientific progress leading to -Big Science‖ today.
Instead, they were the consequence of their context -the city of London. London provided the means and context within which the various tensions between private profits and the common good were worked out, often in unexpected ways involving the interests and actions of -vernacular practitioners‖ who have often been overlooked in constructing the history of science (Harkness 2007, 260) . Scientific progress, if we can even use that term, occurs in her account quite decidedly outside the realm of research laboratories we know from traditional histories of science.
In Harkness' book, the scientists of our usual stories hold a backseat to the -vernacular practioners‖ she concentrates attention on, but they do remain actors. Slightly to the right of her book on our table lies an article which is the only work on the table in which scientists or economists matter almost not at all for the story. Scott Knowles and Stuart Leslie's (2001) examination of Eero Saarinen's corporate research campuses focuses on an architect who was commissioned by GM, IBM and AT&T to design research facilities in the post-war period. In each case, the facility designed by Saarinen is more of a statement about the perceived status of scientific knowledge in society than it is a setting in which scientific knowledge can be pursued.
Ironically, where a non--scientific‖ setting assists the progress of science in Harkness was best studied in natural settings; their ethology was a radical departure from animal studies based on physiological investigation. Among other things, the ethologist had to go to the animals, rather than have dead specimens brought to them; ethologists, therefore, pioneered the creation of field stations and the practices of animal observation associated with them. But they also had to defend their science, both among within biology and in the general public.
Burkhardt's story, therefore, tells us not only of the practices which Tinbergen and Lorenz adopted, but also the justifications they provided to defend their new science, and the conclusions they arrived at. His book is the closest of this group to a full-length biography (and located on our induction, because -graphs brought the hand and the eye to the aid of the mind. They gave shape to the numbers, shape that pictured the regularities hidden in them‖ (Hankins 2006, 633 Tableau were used in France!). Charles argues that -the creation of the Tableau was of paramount importance in the development of Quesnay's economic thinking. It gave concrete shape to Quesnay's intuition of the economy as a set of economic variables interrelated by arithmetical ratios on the basis of which he was able to build a whole model‖ (Charles 2003, 544) . But the Tableau itself was not the model: it was the representation of the economy that allowed Quesnay to begin.
Is the History of Economics Drawing Closer to the History of Science?
If we return to the table in Figure 1 , we can make a preliminary response to question which introduces our conclusion.
Suppose you and I stand on opposite sides of the items in all: 9 of the ten history of science winners, and only 3 of the history of economics award winners.
The conclusion of our study of the award-winning works themselves is as clear as our result when we looked at the authors: just as historians of economics are not leaving economics departments to join Schabas in a history or history of science department, the works they are writing remain, by and large, histories of ideas. While historians of science now predominately write about scientific practices, historians of economics continue to write predominantly about ideas.
For those who would like to see the history of economics begin to move toward the history of practices, some hope can be seen in the increasing attention paid by historians of ideas to the role that the economist plays in the creation and dissemination of ideas, and to the interaction between economists and others (in our award winners, it is usually other social scientists or mathematicians) in the process of creating, defending and disseminating their theories. And, of course, they could also simply go out and write better histories, thereby winning the best book and article awards themselves! 
